Formal Analysis of a Proof-of-Stake Blockchain

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Outline

- Problem Statement
- Background
- Tendermint Consensus Algorithm
- Formal Analysis
- Conclusion



Problem Statement

- Consensus protocols and algorithms are being developed rapidly
- They are fundamental to the chains
- •Formal analysis of these consensus protocols is necessary



Background



Background

•Blockchain – sequence of blocks

•Block – maintains the metadata (the hash value of itself, link to the previous block, signatures) and payload

•Consensus algorithm – protocol used by the nodes in the network to agree on a new block



Consensus Algorithms

Proof-of-work

- Nodes provide the proof by solving a mathematical problem (e.g. Bitcoin)
- Rewarded for performing an operation agreed by majority
- Not punished for performing a malicious operation
- E.g. Bitcoin

Proof-of-stake

- Nodes provide a stake for voting/validating a new block
- Stakes are slashed if a malicious activity is detected
- E.g. Ethereum's Casper, Tendermint

Others: Delegated Proof-of-stake , Proof-of-burn ...



Focus on Proof-of-stake

Proof-of-work

- Scalability concerns
- Waste energy and resources (solving hash puzzles)

Proof-of-stake

- Alternative to the wasteful proof-of-work
- More scalable and robust against certain attacks (E.g. 51% attack)
- Employed by popular blockchain systems Peercoin, Ethereum's Casper, Tendermint (Cosmos)






- Proposals
 - A new block must be proposed by the correct proposer at each round, and gossiped to the other validators
- Votes
 - Two phases of voting occur to ensure optimal Byzantine fault tolerance: *pre-vote* and *pre-commit*
- Locks
 - Prevent two different blocks to be committed at two different rounds at the same height




- Validators chosen in round-robin to become the proposer
- Proposer in charge of proposing a block for the current round
- Proposer/validators
 - Receive proposal/votes from neighbours
 - Validate the block in proposal/votes
 - Post a bond transaction to vote
 - Gossip the proposal/votes











Tendermint Consensus Algorithm: Propose

- Proposer broadcasts a proposal to its peers
- If the proposer has already locked on a block during the


Precommit of the previous round

- Propose the block

Otherwise

- Create a new block








Tendermint Consensus Algorithm: Prevote

- Each validator will vote for a block and gossip it to the neighbours.
- The block to be included is chosen in the following order:
 - A locked proposed block from prior rounds
 - A valid acceptable block from the current proposal
 - NIL if neither is available







Tendermint Consensus Algorithm: Precommit (1/2)

• If validator has more than 2/3 of prevotes for an

acceptable block

- Releases the existing lock
- Locks onto this block
- Signs and broadcasts a precommit vote for this block
- Packages the prevotes for the locked block into a proof-of-lock

Otherwise


- Neither signs nor locks on any block



Tendermint Consensus Algorithm: Precommit (2/2)

- If received more than 2/3 of precommits for a block
 - Proceed to Commit phase for this round
- Otherwise
 - Proceed to Propose phase for next round







Tendermint Consensus Algorithm: Commit

- Receive the block from one of its peers
- Sign and broadcast a commit to other peers
- When > 2/3 commits of the block are received by the network
 - Proceed to *NewHeight*
 - Wait for a fixed duration to receive additional commits of the block
 - Proceed to Propose
- At anytime during the protocol, if > 2/3 commits for a particular block is received,
 - Proceed to Commit



Modelling & Checking



Modelling & Checking

- Built using CSP# and verified using PAT model checker
- Two sets of verifications with 3 validators and 4 validators

Assumptions

- All the nodes in the network are connected to each other
- Existing nodes will not leave the network and no new nodes will join the network
- All nodes have the same voting power/stake
- No network latency



Properties

- 1. Deadlockfree-ness (T1)
- 2. Ability to reach consensus (T2)
- 3. Immunity against block overwrites (A1)
- 4. Immunity against Invalid blocks (A2)
- 5. Immunity against Censorship attacks (A3)
 - The network can reach consensus even with the absence of malicious nodes in the voting process who refuse to broadcast or vote a valid block in order to censor a particular content of the block or censor the node itself



Modelling

BlockChain() = (||x:{0..N-1} @ (Propose(x);
Prevote(x); Precommit(x); PreparePOL(x); Commit(x)));
NextRound();

where P ; Q \rightarrow process P followed by process Q P || Q \rightarrow synchronous processes P and Q.



Attacker Models (1/3)

P0. BlockChain()

P1. BlockChainWithMinorityOverwrite() SimulateMalicious(MINORITY, OVERWRITE_VOTING); BlockChain();

P2. BlockChainWithHalfOverwrite() SimulateMalicious(HALF, OVERWRITE_VOTING); BlockChain();

P3. BlockChainWithMajorityOverwrite() SimulateMalicious(MAJORITY, OVERWRITE_VOTING); BlockChain();



Attacker Models (2/3)

P4. BlockChainWithMinorityInvalid()

SimulateMalicious(MINORITY, INVALID_BLOCK_VOTING); BlockChain();

P5. BlockChainWithHalfInvalid()

SimulateMalicious(HALF, INVALID_BLOCK_VOTING); BlockChain();

P6. BlockChainWithMajorityInvalid()

SimulateMalicious(MAJORITY, INVALID_BLOCK_VOTING); BlockChain();



Attacker Models (3/3)

P7. BlockChainWithMinorityCensor()

SimulateMalicious(MINORITY, NO_VOTING); BlockChain();

P8. BlockChainWithHalfCensor()

SimulateMalicious(HALF, NO_VOTING); BlockChain();

P9. BlockChainWithMajorityCensor()

SimulateMalicious(MAJORITY, NO_VOTING); BlockChain();

Verification Results

Deadlockfree-ness (T1) Ability to reach consensus (T2)



Ability to reach consensus (12) Immunity against block overwrites (A1) Immunity against Invalid blocks (A2) Immunity against Censorship attacks (A3)

	T1	T2	A1	A2	A3
P0 BlockChain	~	~	~	\checkmark	~
P1 (overwrite ≤ 1/3)	~	~	\checkmark		
P2 (1/3 < overwrite < 2/3)	~	X	~		
P3 (overwrite ≥ 2/3)	~	~	X		
P4 (invalid ≤ 1/3)	~	 Image: A second s		\checkmark	
P5 (1/3 < invalid < 2/3)	~	X		\checkmark	
P6 (invalid ≥ 2/3)	~	X		\checkmark	
P7 (no_vote ≤ 1/3)	~	~			~
P8 (1/3 < no_vote < 2/3)	~	×			X
P9 (no_vote ≥ 2/3)	~	X			X



Benchmarks (1/3)

Deadlock-	free	BlockChain	MinorityForking	HalfForking	MajorityForking	MinorityInvalid	HalfInvalid	MajorityInvalid	MinorityCensor	HalfCensor	MajorityCensor
	3 Validators	748	749		749	749		749	598		873
Visited States	4 Validators	17,644	17,645	17,645	17,645	17,645	17,645	17,645	3,249	865	423
Visited States	5 Validators	4,279,260	4,279,261	4,279,261	4,279,261	4,279,261	4,279,261	4,279,261	314,709	4,125	1,335
	6 Validators										
	3 Validators	1,972	1,973		1,973	1,973		1,973	1,385		1,824
Transistions	4 Validators	103,000	103,001	103,001	103,001	103,001	103,001	103,001	13,201	2,385	937
THAIISISCIOUS	5 Validators	42,530,784	42,530,785	42,530,785	42,530,785	42,530,785	42,530,785	42,530,785	2,431,909	15,629	3,853
	6 Validators										
	3 Validators	0.06	0.06		0.05	0.06		0.05	0.04		0.04
Time Taken(s)	4 Validators	3.52	3.48	3.47	3.49	3.42	3.22	3.43	0.47	0.07	0.03
nine raken(s)	5 Validators	1486.10	1430.37	1454.97	1531.58	1638.59	1512.43	1504.90	89.90	0.52	0.11
	6 Validators										
	3 Validators	138.99	144.44		138.95	143.75		142.66	138.22		140.59
Memory Used (MB)	4 Validators	146.39	143.03	145.44	146.81	143.69	140.24	144.29	140.67	140.60	137.79
Welliol y Used (WB)	5 Validators	624.86	109.29	116.63	166.40	460.14	84.17	77.92	121.55	14.52	14.95
	6 Validators										

LEGEND					
Property being verified					
BlockChain Model					
Verified TRUE					
	Verified FALSE				
	Verification Invalid				
	Verification not run due to state space complexity				

Distribution of validators						
Validators	Minority	Half	Majority			
3	1	-	2			
4	1	2	3			
5	1	3	4			
6	2	3	4			



Benchmarks (2/3)

Consens	us	BlockChain	MinorityForking	HalfForking	MajorityForking	MinorityInvalid	HalfInvalid	MajorityInvalid	MinorityCensor	HalfCensor	MajorityCensor
	3 Validators	66	67		67	67		750	65		881
Visited States	4 Validators	142	143	17,646	143	143	17,646	17,646	129	866	424
visited states	5 Validators	266	267	4,279,262	267	267	4,279,262	4,279,262	239	4,126	1,336
	6 Validators	450	451		451	451			335	131,274	4,480
	3 Validators	65	66		66	66		1,973	64		1,824
Transistions	4 Validators	141	142	103,001	142	142	103,001	103,001	128	2,385	937
11011313110113	5 Validators	265	266	42,530,785	266	266	42,530,785	42,530,785	238	15,629	3,853
	6 Validators	449	450		450	450			334	931,969	21,648
	3 Validators	0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.05	0.01		0.04
Time Taken(s)	4 Validators	0.02	0.01	3.22	0.01	0.01	3.07	3.10	0.01	0.07	0.03
nine raken(s)	5 Validators	0.02	0.02	1573.97	0.02	0.02	1512.57	1583.24	0.01	0.58	0.12
	6 Validators	0.05	0.03		0.04	0.03			0.02	39.78	0.81
	3 Validators	138.11	138.19		138.22	138.18		143.05	137.98		140.71
Memory Used (MB)	4 Validators	141.89	142.06	140.86	142.20	142.04	139.22	140.36	140.86	140.79	137.71
wentory Used (WIB)	5 Validators	12.30	12.59	1007.11	12.96	12.55	524.55	690.11	15.10	15.56	15.47
	6 Validators	143.81	146.76		142.08	146.63			140.81	236.94	141.52

LEGEND						
Property being verified						
BlockChain Model						
Verified TRUE						
	Verified FALSE					
	Verification Invalid					
	Verification not run due to state space complexity					

Distribution of validators						
Validators Minority Half Majority						
3	1	-	2			
4	1	2	3			
5	1	3	4			
6	2	3	4			



Benchmarks (3/3)

Forking Att	tack	BlockChain	MinorityForking	HalfForking	MajorityForking
	3 Validators	66	67		750
Visited States	4 Validators	142	143	144	17,646
VISILEU SIALES	5 Validators	266	267	268	4,279,262
	6 Validators	450	451		
	3 Validators	65	66		1,973
Transistions	4 Validators	141	142	143	103,001
Transistions	5 Validators	265	266	267	42,530,785
	6 Validators	449	450		
	3 Validators	0.01	0.01		0.05
Time Taken(s)	4 Validators	0.01	0.01	0.01	3.31
Time Taken(s)	5 Validators	0.02	0.02	0.02	1618.90
	6 Validators	0.03	0.03		
Memory Used (MB)	3 Validators	138.12	138.18		139.91
	4 Validators	141.90	142.07	142.16	141.01
	5 Validators	12.29	12.58	12.80	492.65
	6 Validators	146.06	146.71		

Invalid Block Ir	Invalid Block Insertion		MinorityInvalid	HalfInvalid	MajorityInvalid
	3 Validators	68	69		69
Visited States	4 Validators	143	144	144	144
VISILEU SLALES	5 Validators	267	268	268	268
	6 Validators				
	3 Validators	67	68		68
Transistions	4 Validators	142	143	143	143
Transistions	5 Validators	266	267	267	267
	6 Validators				
	3 Validators	0.01	0.01		0.00
Time Taken(s)	4 Validators	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Time Taken(s)	5 Validators	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
	6 Validators				
	3 Validators	138.13	138.21		138.22
Memory Used (KB)	4 Validators	141.91	142.05	142.14	142.10
	5 Validators	12.34	12.59	12.79	12.68
	6 Validators				

LEGEND					
	Property being verified				
	BlockChain Model				
	Verified TRUE				
	Verified FALSE				
	Verification Invalid				
	Verification not run due to state space complexity				

Distribution of validators						
Validators	idators Minority Half Majority					
3	1	-	2			
4	1	2	3			
5	1	3	4			
6	2	3	4			



Conclusions

- We made a preliminary step towards the formal verification of consensus protocols
 - We modelled the Tendermint consensus algorithm in CSP# with 10 models to simulate several attacks
 - We verified five preliminary properties using PAT
- Additional measures are required to ensure the protocol can withstand censorship attacks
- Models available at <u>https://goo.gl/Jzym4B</u>





Future Works

- Automatic formal verification is limited in verifying consensus protocols with larger numbers of nodes
- Current models and properties are restricted
- We are interested in
 - Studying verification algorithms catered towards blockchains
 - Modelling sophisticated attacks and verifying more complex security properties



Thank you